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ABSTRACT
Many of the authentication schemes for mobile devices that
were proposed lately complicate shoulder surfing by split-
ting the attacker’s attention into two or more entities. For
example, multimodal authentication schemes such as Gaze-
TouchPIN and GazeTouchPass require attackers to observe
the user’s gaze input and the touch input performed on the
phone’s screen. These schemes have always been evaluated
against single observers, while multiple observers could po-
tentially attack these schemes with greater ease, since each of
them can focus exclusively on one part of the password. In
this work, we study the effectiveness of a novel threat model
against authentication schemes that split the attacker’s atten-
tion. As a case study, we report on a security evaluation of two
state of the art authentication schemes in the case of a team
of two observers. Our results show that although multiple
observers perform better against these schemes than single
observers, multimodal schemes are significantly more secure
against multiple observers compared to schemes that employ
a single modality. We discuss how this threat model impacts
the design of authentication schemes.
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INTRODUCTION
Motivated by the need to secure access to personal mobile de-
vices that hold a variety of sensitive and private data, research
has brought forth a plethora of authentication schemes that are
secure against different types of side channel attacks. In par-
ticular, several proposed schemes complicate shoulder surfing
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Figure 1. We investigate how well multiple observers perform against
schemes that split the attacker’s attention. The figure shows a team of
two attackers attempting to observe a multimodal password that consists
of gaze and touch input. An attacker watches a video simulating a shoul-
der surfer observing the user’s phone (B), while the other one watches a
video simulating an attacker watching the user’s eyes (C).
attacks by splitting the observer’s attention. For example, in
contrast to PINs and Android patterns where an attacker needs
to observe the user’s touch input only, multimodal schemes
require attackers to keep track of multiple modalities.
To date, schemes were always evaluated assuming a single
observer performing a one-time attack (e.g., side attack [7,
9, 10, 11]), multiple attacks (e.g., iterative [9, 11, 12], in-
tersection [16] and insider attacks [15]), or video attacks [7,
14]. However, in theft, pick-pocketing and burglary situations,
there are often multiple adversaries. For example, it is often
the case that pickpockets work in teams where one distracts
the victim while the other steals valuables. ATM users are
sometimes subject to a team of shoulder surfers1. Furthermore,
we know from previous research that there are situations in
the real world where multiple people shoulder surf a user. For
example, Eiband et al. reported a case where a user was shoul-
der surfed by two strangers while on the bus, the strangers
then started talking about the user’s destination and followed
her after leaving the bus [8]. Hence, a practical and foresee-
able threat that was never investigated before, is the case of
multiple attackers observing the user simultaneously during
authentication. Threat models have traditionally been devel-
oped with optimal conditions for the attackers in mind. This
1http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4443830/
Footage-pensioner-chasing-gang-Roma-child-thieves.html
makes it crucial to understand whether this model would make
the protective measures of advanced authentication schemes
less effective, since each attacker can focus exclusively on
one part of the password. For example, in case of multimodal
authentication, each attacker could focus on a single modality.
In this work, we investigate how well GazeTouchPass and
GazeTouchPIN perform against multiple observers. We found
that although multiple observers perform better than single
observers, multimodal schemes are still more shoulder surfing
resilient compared to the unimodal baseline.
The contributions of this work are: (1) we propose a novel
threat model that has the potential to render advanced authen-
tication schemes less effective, and (2) we report on a security
study in which we evaluate two state of the art schemes against
this threat model and compare results to previous work.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We build on two strands of related work: (1) Threat Models,
and (2) Protection by Splitting the Attacker’s Attention.
Threat Models
In the context of mobile devices, research in privacy and usable
security discussed a variety of threat models. Perhaps the most
discussed one is shoulder surfing, which is a type of side
channel attacks where a malicious bystander tries to observe
the user’s interactions. A survey by Eiband et al. showed that
shoulder surfing does indeed occur in daily situations, and that
authentication is among the shoulder surfed activities [8].
In addition to casual shoulder surfing, more sophisticated
forms of shoulder surfing were investigated in previous work.
Wiese and Roth studied how the insider threat model can allow
attackers to break secure schemes after multiple partial obser-
vations [15]. Several authentication schemes were evaluated
against threat models in which the attacker has access to a
video recording of the user during authentication (e.g., [6, 7,
13]). Other threat models include smudge attacks [2], and
thermal attacks [1]. These attacks exploit the residues left on
the touchscreen after the user has authenticated to find the
entered password.
In contrast to previous work, in this work we explore a novel
threat model in which multiple observers have the chance to
simultaneously attack a user as a team.
Protection by Splitting the Attacker’s Attention
Several authentication methods were introduced to overcome
shoulder surfing. A widely adopted approach is to overwhelm
the attacker with details that are difficult to keep track of. This
is often done by splitting the attacker’s attention, and requiring
them to observe two or more entities. For example, XSide
requires attackers to observe input on a two-sided touchscreen
[7]. Similarly, being multimodal schemes, GazeTouchPass [9]
and GazeTouchPIN [11] require attackers to observe the user’s
eyes to eavesdrop the gaze input, and the phone’s screen to find
the touch input. Schemes such as SwiPIN [13], PhoneLock
[3], SpinLock [4], TimeLock [5] and Colorlock [5] rely on
users responding to visual, haptic, or auditory cues. Hhence at-
tackers would need to observe both the output cues in addition
to the user’s input in response to these cues.
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Figure 2. Layout (A) was used for GazeTouchPass. User enter passwords
consisting of combinations of digits and gaze gestures to the left and
right, while layouts (B) and (C) were used in GazeTouchPIN. Users select
a digit by touching a row of numbers, then gazing left or right.
MULTIPLE ATTACKERS THREAT MODEL
In the threat model we propose, two attackers are simultane-
ously observing the user. The attackers know how to authen-
ticate, and decide upfront on an observation strategy. In this
threat model, each of the two attackers has a single chance to
observe the assigned part of the authentication process from
an optimal angle (see Figure 1).
After combining their observations, the attackers then get
hold of the phone (e.g., by stealing it or as the user leaves it
unattended), and try to log in using the observed password.
GAZETOUCHPASS AND GAZETOUCHPIN
GazeTouchPass and GazeTouchPIN were introduced and eval-
uated in previous work [9, 11]. They are both multimodal
authentication schemes that combine gaze and touch for pass-
word entry. Hence attacking them requires observing: (1) the
touch input on the touchscreen (Figure 1B), and (2) the gaze
input performed by the eyes (Figure 1C). Both schemes were
evaluated previously against two threat models: (1) iterative
attacks, where an attacker exclusively focuses on observing
one modality at an occasion, and the other modality at a dif-
ferent occasion, and (2) side attacks, where a single attacker
observes both modalities from the side. In the threat model we
introduce in this work, each of the two attackers observes one
of the two modalities, then they combine their observations to
find the password.
In GazeTouchPass, the password consists of numerical digits
entered through the touchscreen (0-9), and gaze gestures (left
and right). It was found that passwords that contain more
switches from one modality to another are more secure. For
example, Touch(1), Gaze(left), Touch(2), Gaze(Right) has
3 switches from one modality to another, while Touch(1),
Touch(2), Gaze(left), Gaze(Right) has only 1 switch. This
means that the former password is more observation-resilient.
This is because as the number of switches increases, the num-
ber of consecutive inputs using the same modality decreases,
which results in a larger range of possible combinations of the
inputs observed from the user’s touch and gaze actions. When
observing a view (e.g., Figure 1B), attackers noticed pauses
in-between the inputs, and inferred that the user provided input
using the other modality during these pauses.
Unlike GazeTouchPass, GazeTouchPIN uses traditional PINs
that are entered using touch and gaze. Users first select a
pair of digits from one of two predefined layouts (Figures 2B
and 2C), and then gaze left or right to select the digit to be
entered. The choice of which layout to show at each entry is
determined randomly. This means that if an attacker observes
the touch input, and then later observes the gaze input, the
attacker would not know which layout the user is responding
to. Hence there is only 12n chance that an iterative attack would
lead to observing matching gaze and touch input. Due to
this random element, iterative attacks are very less likely to
succeed against GazeTouchPIN.
In the case of multiple observers, attackers can observe both
inputs in parallel, hence they neither need to rely on pauses
and consecutive inputs to observe GazeTouchPass, nor is the
random layout of GazeTouchPIN as effective.
OBSERVATION STUDY
The main goal of this study is to investigate how the multiple
observers threat model influences the security of GazeTouch-
Pass and GazeTouchPIN. We used videos of users entering
passwords using both schemes. The videos were recorded
from an optimal angle during the usability evaluations of the
schemes. They are the same videos used previously to evaluate
the security of GazeTouchPass and GazeTouchPIN [9, 11].
Design
The study was designed as a repeated measures experiment
with a single independent variable: the password type. As ex-
plained previously, GazeTouchPass passwords could consist of
multiple switches in input modality. Hence, we included four
conditions: 3-switches, 2-switches, 1-switch, and 0-switches.
The latter condition refers to having no switches in modalities
when entering the password i.e., a unimodal password. This
means that when two observers attack GazeTouchPass with
0-switches, they will be both observing the same modality.
This was considered a baseline in our experiment. The fifth
and last condition is GazeTouchPIN. Each team of attackers
observed 3 passwords of each type. This means that each team
attacked 15 passwords (3 passwords× 5 password types) The
conditions were counter-balanced using a latin square.
Participants
We invited 20 participants (9 females), each two were assigned
to a team and took the role of a team of attackers. Each
participant was awarded 10 Euro online shop voucher. An
additional 20 Euro voucher was raffled among all teams such
that the more successful guesses a team has, the more likely
they win the additional prize. This was done to encourage
participants to put an effort into trying to find the passwords.
Apparatus and Procedure
Each team watched two video clips on two different 17” dis-
plays (see Figure 1). Both videos started at the same time.
Observers were free to examine the layouts (Figure 2) and to
take notes at any time during the study. The pair were allowed
to communicate at any time to, for example, discuss strate-
gies. The pair were positioned at opposite sides of the table,
to simulate an attacker observing the user’s face, and another
Figure 3. The figure shows that, similar to previous work, the Leven-
shtein distance is larger in case of 2- and 3-switches. This means that
GazeTouchPass is more secure when more switches exist in the password.
GazeTouchPIN is far less secure against our threat model compared to
previously studied ones, since the random layout is no longer effective
when two attackers observe simultaneously. Overall, while success rates
are much higher in the multiple observers threat model compared to
models studied in the past, both schemes still outperform the baseline.
one observing the user’s touchscreen. After each video, the
participants had time to discuss their solution and could state
up to three guesses for the password. We concluded with a
semi-structured interview.
RESULTS
To evaluate the success of the attacks, we measured (1) the
Levenshtein distance between the guesses and the correct
password, and (2) the success rate, which is the number of
correct guesses out of all attacked passwords.
A repeated measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser cor-
rection showed a significant main effect for the password type
(F1.87,16.82 = 4.32, p < 0.05). Post-hoc analysis with Bon-
ferroni correction revealed a significant difference between
GazeTouchPass with 0-switches and GazeTouchPass with 2-
switches. Although the other pairs were not significantly differ-
ent, we found a tendency for more successful guesses against
GazeTouchPass with no switches, compared to GazeTouch-
Pass with 1-, 2-, and 3-switches (see Figure 3). This matches
results from previous work [9], which reported that the more
switches in a GazeTouchPass password exist, the harder it
is to observe. Furthermore, we found that GazeTouchPIN is
less secure than many configurations of GazeTouchPass. This
is expected since the random layout is no longer as effective
when two attackers are observing the user at the same time.
Qualitative Feedback
The participants indicated their relationship to the other at-
tacker in their team. In six teams, the attackers were friends,
in three of them they were acquaintances, and the remaining
pair were strangers. We did not find any effect of the relation-
ship between the attackers on successful guesses. Participants
reported that they devised strategies with their partners. For
example, they would count in their heads to try to estimate the
positions of the inputs from the other modality. The attacker
who observed the touch input was able to see whether the
successful login screen was shown after the last touch input,
or if the last touch input was followed by a pause. This gave
the attackers hints about the positions of the observed inputs.
DISCUSSION
The results indicate that a team of two attackers are better
at guessing passwords compared to a single attacker. This
can be seen in Table 1, which shows a comparison between
the success rates in our study and success rates in previous
work [9, 11]. The reason behind the higher success against the
baseline condition (GazeTouchPass with 0-switches) is that
both attackers saw the same video. Attackers were able to
discuss their guesses afterwards, and this allowed them to fine-
tune the three submitted guesses based on two observations
instead of only one. Attackers performed better against the
other conditions of GazeTouchPass as well due to the same
reason: overall, the team had higher exposure to the password
and was able to better identify the pauses between the inputs
from different modalities. For example, observing Touch(1),
Pause, Touch (2) in the phone view (Figure 1B) suggests that
there is one or more gaze inputs in between those two touch
inputs. These pauses in turn help the attackers identify how to
order their observations. At the same time, the main reason be-
hind incorrect guesses against GazeTouchPass is the ordering
of inputs; in the vast majority of cases, the correct inputs were
observed by the attackers, but the guessed order was incorrect
(e.g., guessing Touch(1), Gaze(Left), Touch(2), Gaze(Right)
instead of Gaze(Left), Touch(1), Touch(2), Gaze(Right)).
Finally, the better performance against GazeTouchPIN is due
to the parallel observations. Note that in its previous evalua-
tions, GazeTouchPIN was very secure against iterative attacks
because each time the user enters a digit, the layout could have
been different. This made it unfeasible for attackers to identify
which layout the user is responding to when observing their
eye movements. This security advantage is no longer present
in case of parallel multiple observers attacks; the attacker ob-
serving the screen could note down the touch input and the
shown layout, while the other one observes the gaze input.
Combining the observations in this case would be trivial.
Other Authentication Schemes
In this work we evaluated GazeTouchPass and GazeTouchPIN
against the multiple observers threat model because they are
state-of-the-art schemes that secure against shoulder surfing
by splitting the attacker’s attention. However, similar results
are expected in case of other similar types of schemes. For
example, XSide separates the input on a double-sided touch-
screen [7]. Similarly, in our threat model each attacker would
focus on only one side, before they combine their observations.
Schemes that rely on the user’s response to auditory, visual
or haptic feedback can be vulnerable to multiple attackers if
one of them observes the system’s output, while the other one
focuses on the user’s input.
Splitting the Attacker’s Attention is still the Way to go
Although multiple observers perform better than single ones
when attacking GazeTouchPass and GazeTouchPIN compared
to single observers, their success is significantly worse than
when attacking the baseline (see Table 1). This means that
while these schemes are not as effective against multiple at-
tackers as they are against single observers, they are still more
secure than the baseline and hence we would recommend
using them.
Number of
GazeTouchPass GazeTouchPIN
0-switches 1-switch 2-switches 3-switchesattackers (baseline)
Single 63% 46% 37% 23% 4%
Multiple 97% 80% 57% 67% 67%
Table 1. Compared to previous evaluations of GazeTouchPass and Gaze-
TouchPIN [9, 11], the multiple attackers threat model results in more
successful attacks against the said schemes.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we proposed a novel threat model and evaluated
two state-of-the-art authentication schemes against it. We
found that the multiple observers threat model is effective
and renders some of the security features of authentication
schemes less effective. However, multimodal schemes perform
significantly better than single model schemes in resisting
multiple observers attacks.
In future work, it would be interesting to evaluate other
schemes such as XSide [7], SwiPIN [13], PhoneLock [3],
SpinLock [4], TimeLock [5] and Colorlock [5] against this
threat model. Another interesting direction for future work
is to investigate combined threat models. For example, an
attacker could observe a user’s gaze input while authenticating
using GazeTouchPIN or GazeTouchPass, and then perform a
thermal attack [1] or a smudge attack [2] to infer touch input.
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